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Abstract
Network externalities are commonly observed in
many markets in e-commerce, especially in the
software market. Many software firms provide
free-version products to attract consumers. In this
paper, we build a discrete-time dynamical system
to investigate why software providers choose to
offer commercial versions of products as well as
free versions when network externalities are
present. We first propose a monopoly model, and
then build a duopoly model with two competitors,
and one of whom doesn’t adopt free-version
strategy. Simulation results verify that the presence
of network externalities induces firms to provide
free-version products.
Key words: network externalities; dynamical
system; free-version product; software product;
e-commerce.

1. Introduction
The network externality can be defined as a change
in the utility that a user derives from consumption
of a product when the number of other users
consuming the same product changes. This
phenomenon
was
first
identified
in
telecommunication network, and then on many
other products, such as operating systems,
computer games, typewriter keyboards, and online
trading platforms in the e-commerce.
Research on network externalities enjoys a high
popularity in the past three decades. In the classic
article by Katz and Shapiro [1], a static model
based on the maximization of profit function and
the fulfilled expectations equilibrium was
developed to analyze markets in which
consumption externalities are present. Following
the seminal work of Katz and Shapiro [1],
subsequent researchers have examined product
compatibility and standardization [2] [3], pricing
strategies [4] [5], technology revolutions [6] [7],
online service adoption [8], etc. However, most of
the models in the above literatures were developed
in a static framework without considering dynamic
aspect. These models gave a lot of insights into
network externalities, but left aside much empirical
evidence in which the dynamic aspect is crucial [9].
Only a few articles discussed network externalities
in a dynamic environment [9] [10] [11]. Bensaid

and Lesne [9] developed a discrete-time model to
study the optimal dynamic monopoly pricing.
Lambertini and Orsini [10] reconsidered the role of
network externalities in a dynamic spatial
monopoly by applying differential equations.
In the software market, many firms provide
different versions at different prices via the Internet.
And sometimes there are free versions, e.g. the
Microsoft Corporation began to provide a free
version of office2010 recently. How is it possible
that firms are willing to offer free products? What
theory explains this economic phenomenon? Based
on two-sided network effects, Geoffrey and van
Alstyne [4] built a model to illustrate the reasons
and results of providing free-version products. Jing
[12] investigated how network externalities affect
the product line decision of a firm. In this paper,
we build a discrete-time dynamical system to
investigate the effects of the free-version product
on a market where network externalities exist. This
problem is discussed first in the monopoly, then in
the duopoly setting where two firms adopt different
strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
section 2, a monopoly dynamical system is
described. By analyzing the fixed point of the
system, we find out three different market
evolution patterns. The effects of parameter
variation on the market evolution process are
identified from the simulation results. Section 3
extends the model to a competitive environment,
and analyzes the advantages of offering
free-version product by simulation. Section 4
summarizes and concludes this paper.

2. Monopoly model and analysis
2.1 Dynamic model
Consider a monopoly market over multiple
discrete-time periods (t=0, 1, 2…) where the
monopolist supplies two versions of products. One
version is for free, while the price of the other with
more functions is p as a commercial product.
The value of the products consists of two parts:
intrinsic value and network value. Intrinsic value is
the utility a user obtains from the product’s
inherent features, and network value depends on its
network size. Let u1 denote the intrinsic value of
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u 2 the intrinsic value of the
commercial version ( u 2 > u1 ). Similar to the

the free version, and

equations in [12], the product with intrinsic value
u can obtain a network value of (e + ku )Q ,
where e, k ≥ 0 , and Q
consumers of both versions.

For simplicity, assume that the transfer rate

r01 (t ) = αTu1 ,

is the number of

Now we turn to the demand side. Each consumer
demands at most one unit of product. Assume that
the total consumer population is 1. The utility
consumers obtained from two versions of products
can be denoted respectively by

Tu1 (t ) = u1 + (e + ku1 )Q(t ),
(1)

Tu 2 (t ) = u2 + (e + ku2 )Q(t ) − p.

0
r02 (t ) = 
αTu 2

Here

Free-version
users ( s1 )

Tu 2 > 0,

(5)

(6)

is the precondition of Eqs.(4), (5) and (6).

0 ≤ αTu1 ≤ 1,

0 ≤ αTu 2 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ α (T − T ) ≤ 1.
u2
u1


(7)

2.2 Equilibria and market evolution
We first consider the equilibria of system (3), and
then discuss the market evolution patterns for
different parameter values. The fixed points of the
map (3) can be obtained by setting
x(t + 1) = x(t ) and y (t + 1) = y (t ) , that is

(1 − x(t ) − y (t ))r01 − x(t )r12 = 0 ,

r01 (t )
Potential
consumers ( s0 )

(4)

rij (t ) belongs to the interval [0, 1], so Eq.(7)

state

version. In each time period, consumers will decide
whether to change their states or not. This process
can be illustrated by Fig.1.

Tu 2 ≤ 0,

Tu 2 − Tu1 ≤ 0,
0
r12 (t ) = 
α (Tu 2 − Tu1 ) Tu 2 − Tu1 > 0.

In this dynamic system, there are three states for
the consumers: {s0 , s1 , s 2 } . Consumers in the

s0 use neither of the two versions, while
consumers in the state s1 use the free version, and
those in the state s2 have bought the commercial

rij (t )

is proportional positively to the utility difference
between state i and j:

(1 − x(t ) − y (t ))r02 + x(t )r12 = 0 .

r12 (t )

(8)
(9)

Tu1 (t ) > 0 , thus r01 (t ) > 0 . Hence, there exist

r02 (t )
Commercial-version
consumers ( s2 )
Fig.1 States transfer paths

three equilibra in the market evolution as follows.
(1) If

r02 (t ) > 0, r12 (t ) > 0 .

From Eq.(9), we can obtain

rij (t )(0 ≤ rij (t ) ≤ 1, t = 1, 2, ...) is the rate of

x(t ) = 0,

consumers transferring from state i to state j in time
period t. In this paper, we only consider software
products, and the state transfer paths of consumers
can only be s0 to s1 , s0 to s2 , or s1 to s2 .

1 − x(t ) − y (t ) =
0.

This process is irreversible. If we denote the
quantity
of
free-version
users
and
commercial-version consumers in time period t by
x(t ), y (t ) respectively, then

Q(t ) = x(t ) + y (t ).

(2)

Therefore, this dynamical system can be described
by

 x(t + 1) = x(t ) + (1 − x(t ) − y (t ))r01 − x(t )r12 ,
(3)

 y (t + 1) = y (t ) + (1 − x(t ) − y (t ))r02 + x(t )r12 .

Hence, the Nash equilibrium is

 x * = 0,
 *
 y = 1.
(2) If

r02 (t ) = 0, r12 (t ) = 0 .

Q(t ) = x(t ) + y (t ) increases with time t , thus
Tu 2 and Tu 2 − Tu1 increase with time t , so

r02 (t ) and r12 (t ) are increasing functions.
Therefore, if
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r02 (t ) = 0, r12 (t ) = 0 ,
then

y (t ) = 0 .
Subsequently, we can obtain

x(t ) = 1 .
Hence, the Nash equilibrium is

 x * = 1,
 *
 y = 0.
(3) If

r02 (t ) > 0, r12 (t ) = 0 .

Fig.3 Market evolution pattern 2
( α = 0.2, k = 1, e = 1, u1 = 0.2, u 2 = 1, p = 3.2 )

From Eqs.(8) and (9), it can be deduced that Nash
equilibrium satisfies

 x * + y * = 1,
 *
 x > 0,
 y * > 0.


(10)

Three equilibria are totally different from each
other, and the market evolution processes are also
different. Figs.2-4 show different market evolution
patterns under the above three conditions.
Pattern 1 in Fig.2 is the most ideal pattern to the
firm. The quantity of free-version users increases at
first, then more and more users of the free version
purchase the commercial version with the
increasing of commercial version’s total utility.
Therefore, x (t ) decreases to zero. Pattern 2 in
Fig.3 is the worst pattern as no one will purchase
the commercial version, that’s because its total
utility isn’t big enough. In pattern 3, there are
consumers who will purchase the commercial
version, but no consumers will transfer from
free-version user to commercial-version consumer
as r12 (t ) = 0 during all periods.

Fig.4 Market evolution pattern 3
( α = 0.2, k = 1, e = 1, u1 = 0.2, u 2 = 1, p = 1.8 )

2.3 Numerical simulations
In the following, we present some numerical
simulations to show the effects of parameter
variations on the market evolution process. We
present two main cases. In the first one, the price of
the commercial version is variable while the rest
parameters are all constant. In the second one, the
intrinsic value of the free version is the only
variable.
The variation of p will impact the market
structure and evolution. In order to investigate the
effects, it’s convenient to take the parameter values
as follows: α = 0.2, k = 1, e = 1, u1 = 0.2, u 2 = 1 .
From the analysis of section 2.2 and Eqs.(4), (5)
and (6), it’s easy to draw the conclusion that:
(1) If p ∈ (0, 1.6) , market evolution pattern will
be the ideal one with all the consumers buying the
commercial version finally (similar to the curves in
Fig.2).

Fig.2 Market evolution pattern 1
( α = 0.2, k = 1, e = 1, u1 = 0.2, u 2 = 1, p = 0.8 )

(2) If
worst

p ≥ 3 , market evolution pattern will be the
one

with

no

consumers

buying

the
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commercial version (similar to the curves in Fig.4).
(3) If p ∈ [1.6, 3) , market evolution pattern will
be the second one in which no free-version user
will buy the commercial version, as the total utility
of the commercial version isn’t bigger than that of
the free version.

enlarges, thus the growth speed is faster in the
initial periods. However, as time period proceeds,
higher intrinsic value of the free version will lead
to a lower transfer rate from free version to
commercial version, as in Fig.8, and we find that
y (t ) decreases with u1 during the interim
periods.

Fig.5 and Fig.6 illustrate market evolution curves
for p ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5} . The maximum value of
free-version users increases with p , while the
growth speed of the commercial-version consumers
decreases with it.

Fig.5 Market evolution curves of

Fig.6 Market evolution curves of

Fig. 7 Market evolution curves of

x(t )

Fig. 8 Market evolution curves of

y (t )

Fig. 9 Market evolution curves of

y (t )

x(t )

y (t )

Similarly, we run a simulation based on the
variation of parameter u1 , other parameters are set

as: α = 0.2, k = 1, e = 1, p = 0.8, u 2 = 1 . Fig.7,
Fig.8, and Fig.9 illustrate market evolution curves
for u1 ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9} .
Fig.9 shows that the growth speed of the number of
commercial-version consumers increases with the
intrinsic value of the free version at the beginning.
That’s due to that the population of free-version
users is bigger when the intrinsic value is higher, so
the network value of the commercial version
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3. Duopoly model and simulations
3.1 Duopoly model
In this section, we consider a duopoly setting with
a competitor who only provides one version of its
product at the price of p ' . And its intrinsic value
is u ' . In order to describe the system clearly, we
represent the free-version product of the first firm
with A' , the commercial version with A , and the
product of the second firm with B . As a
competitor is taken into consideration, a fourth
state of the system appears. We denote the new
state which represents product B ’s consumers by
s3 . Fig.10 is the state transfer paths in competitive
environment.

Users of product A’ ( s1 )

r12 (t )

r01 (t )
Potential
consumers ( s0 )

r02 (t )

3.2 Numerical simulations
The main purpose of this section is to analyze the
advantages of offering free-version product by
simulation. Fig.11 shows the market evolution
process with parameters are set as follows: α = 0.2,

k= 1, =
e 1, p= p=' 0.9, u=
0.2, u=
u=' 1.
1
2

y (t ) = z (t ), u 2 = u ' , p = p ' and
x(t ) > 0 in time period t，then Tu 2 (t ) > Tu 3 (t ) ,

Assume that

thus

r02 (t ) > r03 (t ) , so y (t + 1) > y (t ) , which

means that the existence of the free-version product
A' can promote the growth speed of the
commercial-version product A .
From the analysis above and Fig.11, we can
conclude that under the conditions of p = p ' and

u 2 = u ' , the growth speed of y (t ) is faster than
that of z (t ) , and the final market share of product
A is bigger than that of product B .

Consumers of
product A ( s2 )

r03 (t )
Consumers of
product B ( s3 )
Fig.10 States transfer paths

r03 (t=
) α Tu 3 (0 ≤ α Tu 3 ≤ 1) is the rate of
consumers who purchase product B in time
period t. The user quantity of product B in time
period t is denoted by z (t ) . For simplicity,
network externalities between products offered by
different firms are not considered in this paper.
Therefore, the utility consumers obtained from
different products can be described respectively as

Tu1 (t ) = u1 + (e + ku1 )Q (t ),

Tu 2 (t ) = u 2 + (e + ku 2 )Q (t ) − p,
T (t ) = u '+(e + ku ' ) z (t ) − p '.
 u3

(11)

Then the discrete-time dynamical system is
described as

 x (t + 1)=


 y (t + 1)=


 z (t + 1)=

x (t ) + (1 − x (t ) − y (t ) − z (t ))r01
− x (t ) r12 ,
y (t ) + (1 − x (t ) − y (t ) − z (t ))r02 (12)
+ x (t ) r12 ,
z (t ) + (1 − x (t ) − y (t ) − z (t ))r03.

Fig.11 Market evolution processes
Finally, we run a simulation based on the variations
of parameter p and u 2 . Fig.12 shows the

simulation results for p ∈ {0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2} ,
with α = 0.2, k = 1, e = 1, p ' = 0.8, u ' = u 2 = 1, u1 = 0.2 .
Fig.13 shows the results of simulation for
u2 ∈ {0.7, 0.8，0.9, 1.0} , and other parameters are

α = 0.2, k = 1, e = 1, p ' = p = 0.8, u ' = 1, u1 = 0.2

.
We can observe from Fig.12 and Fig.13 that the
final market share of product A decreases with
its price, and if the final market share of product
A equals that of product B , the price of A
will be higher than that of B . And the final
market share of product A increases with the
intrinsic value of it. Similarly, if the final market
share of product A equals that of product B ,
the intrinsic value of A will be lower than that of
B . Therefore, the presence of network
externalities induces the firm to provide
free-version product.
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(a)

p =0.6

(b)

p =0.8

(b)

u 2 =0.9

(c)

p =1.0

(c)

u 2 =0.8

(d)

p =1.2

(d)

u 2 =0.7

Fig.12 Market evolution processes

(a)

u 2 =1

Fig.13 Market evolution processes
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From the simulations above, when the price of the
commercial version is not too high and the intrinsic
value of it is not too low, the market share of the
commercial version from the first company is bigger
than that of the product offered by the competitor who
doesn’t adopt free-version strategy, and the
profitability of the first firm is also much stronger.
That’s because the commercial version benefits from
the network externalities engendered by the free
version. However, if the price of the commercial
version is too high or the intrinsic value of it is too low,
a lot of users will continue to use the free version.

4. Conclusions
In this paper we proposed and analyzed a discrete-time
dynamical system to investigate the effects of the
network externalities generated by free-version product.
We first built a monopoly model with no competition.
Through fixed points analysis and simulations, we
found out three market evolution patterns. The impacts
of the parameter variations on market structure and
evolution were simulated in experiments .After that,
the model was extended to a competitive environment.
Simulation results show that, the firm who adopt
free-version strategy will get a higher market growth
speed and a bigger market share, because its
commercial-version product can gain a larger network
value through the free-version product. Furthermore,
the firm who adopt free-version strategy may still
obtain bigger market share and more profits even
though the price of its commercial-version product is
higher and its the intrinsic value is lower. Therefore, it
is almost always profitable for software providers to
offer free-version products in the market with network
externalities. Future research will focus on the optimal
pricing strategy of multi-version products in the
monopoly and duopoly in the e-commerce.
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